Significant research efforts have been dedicated to designing cryptographic algorithms that are quantum-resistant. The motivation is clear: robust quantum computers, once available, may render current cryptographic standards vulnerable. Thus, we need new Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms, and, due to the nature and inherent complexity of such algorithms, there is also a demand to accelerate them in hardware. In this talk, we show that PQC hardware accelerators can be backdoored by two different adversaries located in the chip supply chain. We propose REPQC, a sophisticated reverse engineering algorithm that can be employed to confidently identify hashing operations (i.e., Keccak) within the PQC accelerator - the location of which serves as an anchor for finding secret information to be leaked. From there, adversaries can mount diverse attacks, including backdoors and hardware trojans. The talk concludes by affirming that we have to be mindful of existing threats, even for future deployment.