With the growing complexity of systems, design phases increasingly rely on the interaction of several industrial actors. This makes it more difficult, especially at the hardware level, for an end-user to know what is being inserted at each stage, even for very specific needs, and can be a blocking point for revising the system later on.

In terms of security, using only a high level of abstraction alone does not protect against several attacks or malicious acts that exploit the target's low-level characteristics. Since only third parties know the implementation details of the component for which they are responsible, there is an increasing need for direct monitoring of signals coming from the micro-architecture to cover attacks targeting this layer.
Suppliers may intentionally or not produce a component that is vulnerable to attacks against the micro-architecture. To detect attacks at this level, we propose a mechanism to extract a large set of signals and select to most relevant ones to study the behavior of industrial-type systems. These systems often have small processors with lightweight operating systems, sometimes with real-time constraints.

To simulate various such systems, we have built an FPGA platform for continuous monitoring of the micro-architectural signals, based on LiteX, with different choices of parameters such as CPUs and peripherals. Our work extends the MATANA framework, which enables run-time detection of Cache Side-Channel and Return-Oriented Programming attacks. We are also extending the framework to support hardware trojans targeting industrial systems, with automated insertion tools. Experiments are designed for high bandwidth data transfer to a host computer.